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In the early 1950s, Professor C.A.W. Manning, now into the third decade of his tenure as 
head of the department of international relations (IR) at the London School of Economics (LSE), 
was at something of turning point in his career. Having been at the forefront of studies of 
international affairs in the U.K. before the war, recently things had not been going so well. Some 
work for Chatham House during the war had ended rather disastrously without publication. 
Manning had been a leading light of the British branch of the International Studies Conference 
(ISC), the League-era international organization of academic international relations, but this was 
now stumbling to its demise. Furthermore, his native South Africa was in the process of 
alienating itself from the international community and the Commonwealth in particular through 
its adoption of apartheid. 
 At this time Manning embarked on a course of action that was to be the basis of his 
renown in the IR profession.
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 Turning away from his previous work on law in the international 
system, collective security and international sanctions, Manning picked up the baton from the 
much-missed S.H. Bailey in defense of the academic study of IR. His advocacy of the idea that 
international relations should be taught as a separate academic discipline appeared in his short 
UNESCO-published book on IR, but this was to be more or less the last hurrah for the ISC.
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With the collapse of international and European efforts to advance the cause, Manning 
retrenched to his home turf at the LSE.  
Unfortunately for this strategy, austerity in the U.K. in the wake of the Second World 
War did not create an environment conducive to expansion or experimentation in the tertiary 
education sector. Thus the prospects for the growth or consolidation of Manning’s conception of 
the study of international relations seemed altogether rather bleak. In this context he turned to the 
Rockefeller Foundation (RF) for support.  
Manning already had a long-established relationship with the RF. Before his time at the 
LSE, when he was still an Oxford don, he had been a Laura Spelman Fellow at Harvard for the 
academic year 1925-1926.
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 The RF had sponsored the activities of the ISC in the 1930s, in which 
Manning had been a consistent participant. And since 1936, a good portion of his salary was in 
effect paid for by the RF. Manning had been the somewhat surprising successor to Philip Noel 
Baker in the Cassel Chair of International Relations in 1930. With the stock market crash 
however, Cassel confirmed they would not renew the funding, so the LSE went in search of 
another donor. By 1936 Montague Burton had offered a substantial sum, though still less than 
was required. The LSE Director at the time sought supplemental support from the RF, but this 
being denied, instead, redirected funds from the general grant the LSE received.
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Manning was, as a consequence of this decade-long relationship, perhaps if not confident, 
then at least hopeful that support might be forthcoming. He submitted a proposal for five-year 
funding of a number of fellowships to support and develop the talent needed for teaching 
international relations in the U.K., the reasoning being that at present LSE was a lonely outpost 
in teaching the subject. Written initially in September 1952, and submitted to the RF two years 
later, the proposal itself was rather brief and informal compared to the expectations attending 
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such applications today. The character of its presentation and the technical questions about the 
permissibility of such funding were to be only a couple of the difficulties that the proposal faced. 
The challenges included Manning himself. While supportive of the proposal in principle, 
officers at the RF simply were not convinced that Manning was the man for the job 
intellectually. First of all, his advancing age suggested someone rather out of touch, while the 
more positive assessment of Manning’s junior colleague, Martin Wight, was an invidious 
comparison rather than reason to support Manning’s scheme. Second, the proposal arrived in the 
midst of moves to develop academic international relations, in particular, the contemporaneous 
RF-sponsored conference discussed in Nicolas Guilhot’s edited collection, The Invention of 
International Relations Theory.
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 Manning’s view of IR did not mesh well with American 
approaches and was considered by some eccentric. Finally, the lay of the academic land at LSE 
was a good deal more hostile than helpful. The reception at the LSE of the RF’s queries of 
whether the School supported its own professor’s submission was decidedly cool and prompted 
efforts to devise an alternative scheme.  
On Dean Rusk’s prompting, Kenneth Thompson sought the views of a number of senior 
American scholars as to the caliber of Manning and his proposal.
6
 The resulting assessments—
from Richard Snyder, Arnold Wolfers, Frederick Dunn, Harold Sprout, William T.R. Fox, and 
Percy Corbett—make interesting reading in themselves, though they paint more of a personal 
picture of Manning’s career, rather than being indicative of broader developments in 
international relations on each side of the Atlantic. Overall, the assessments pay tribute to an 
acute mind, but also suggest that Manning could be obtuse and his arguments obscure. Arnold 
Wolfers claimed that he had not seen any work by Manning or indeed references to any since the 
1930s, although he acknowledged that “he had a fine mind and original ideas.”7 Fox, in an 
4 
 
interview with Thompson, on October 11, 1954, is recorded as having suggested that “CAWM’s 
lack of productivity was partly due to the fact that he has a very high order intellect, which 
makes him formulate new questions before settling the original ones.” 
Percy Corbett stated that “With the greatest admiration for his critical acumen, I have 
usually found him so balanced between the negative and positive aspects of any problem that it 
was impossible for him to say yes or no without a flock of qualifications.”8 In addition, Frederick 
S. Dunn suggested that “he is a man of some definite talents, but there has been a logical block to 
his thinking … He was prone to get lost in endless logical spinning of ideas which did not come 
out anywhere in particular.”9 Others, while liking him personally, found him ineffective. 
Sadly, Manning’s own words betray him in this regard. In the note that initiated the 
proposal he raised a number of important issues, but the one-sentence opening paragraph sums 
up the problem with his writing style and form of argument: “The purpose of this note is to make 
available in concise form the main considerations affecting the question in which it is suggested 
that some help from outside sources might, at this moment, be opportunely afforded to the 
particular centre of higher education in which, uniquely among such institutions in the United 
Kingdom, the subject of international relations has, as an independent discipline, been given as 
yet its most effective development.”10 Yes, this was Manning trying to be concise! By contrast, 
the impression of Martin Wight was overwhelmingly positive and there are numerous references 
to this effect by Thompson and also Rusk.
11
 Had Wight advanced the proposal, it would have 
received a good deal more happy reception from the RF. Indeed, some of the correspondence 
hint that this is what was hoped might happen. It was not to be, but in any case, the comparison 
reflected poorly on Manning and contributed to a sense of waiting for succession to occur. 
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However, it was not only Manning’s scholarship that was a problem. It was also the very 
format for international relations that he hoped to promulgate through the proposal that troubled 
some. While Harold Sprout considered Manning’s approach a good representative of a 
systematic multidisciplinary perspective, he was “not wholly clear as to Manning’s concept of 
international relations as a separate academic discipline.”12  Indeed, this conception did run 
contrary to that being developed at the same time in the conference on IR theory, which placed 
IR as a subspecies of politics and the subject of a variant of political theory. 
In light of the decidedly mixed reports, Rusk approached the Director of the LSE, 
Alexander Carr-Saunders, to get an impression of the School’s view of the proposal, writing on 
October 8, 1954, that “Professor Manning is known to us as an interesting and provocative, if 
controversial, scholar,” but noting, on November 12, 1954, that there was “a distressing 
difference of view about the quality of his scholarship and the value of his contribution.” Rusk 
indicated therefore that the RF was unlikely to fund him alone, but would consider a variation on 
the proposal.  
Carr-Saunders’ response was initially cautious and then blunt. On November 19, 1954, he 
told Rusk that, “there is very little support in the School for Professor Manning’s thesis that 
international relations constitute a separate academic discipline.” Instead, he pointed to 
scholarship that had been, and continued to be, conducted in the School in international law,  
international history, and international trade, including the work of such prominent figures as 
Herscht Lauterpacht and C.K. Webster. Carr-Saunders liked the idea of a scheme to bring these 
studies together. The characterization of the proposal as international relations rather than 
international studies was an obstacle for Carr-Saunders, however, since he interpreted this as 
indicating a preference for a scheme emanating from the international relations department. 
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Having been assured that this was not in fact a requirement, Carr-Saunders pitched a 
multidisciplinary project involving four departments directly concerned with international 
affairs, covering the subjects International Relations, International Law, International 
Economics, and International History, and in addition various comparative and other related 
studies conducted in the departments of Government, Geography, and Anthropology.
13
 In 
conversation with Thompson, Carr-Saunders suggested that, “discussions on the original 
proposal from C.A.W. Manning had permitted the faculty at LSE to reassess work in the field of 
international studies.”14 This had long been needed and was a good thing, but was now being 
hindered, he claimed, by Manning who “apparently resents the fact that he has not been placed in 
the center of these deliberations.” As a result, Manning had initially been excluded from 
discussions in the School. Instead, the very broad conception of the field in the revised proposal 
reflected the influence, among others, of Professor of Public Administration, W.A. Robson, and 
thus included Robson’s own specialism, the comparative study of cities.15 
While he seems for the most part to have been kept out of the loop of these discussions, 
Manning became progressively more wary and doubtful as to the prospects of his proposal being 
accepted. Though worried about support in the LSE committee charged to deal with it, Manning 
wrote to Thompson on November 14, 1954, in his whimsical style that, “Operation mustard seed 
is, I understand, to be laid this coming Wednesday.” After the meeting, his doubts had increased, 
manifested in the missive to Thompson on November 27, 1954, in which, while acknowledging 
the interest of a number of departments in the proposal, Manning decried their grasping influence 
upon it: “What I should like soon to discover is whether the September memorandum, and the 
case it argues, is what we are any longer supposed to be discussing at all.” It was not, in fact, as 
Carr-Saunders’ correspondence with Rusk indicates. Returning to the seed metaphor and 
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reflecting the multidisciplinary impetus of the forces ranged against him in the School, Manning 
resigned himself to the notion that, “Maybe in the end we must pass up our plate for all-this-and-
mustard-too!” 
As the amended, effectively alternative, proposal was developed, Manning acquiesced 
despite being far from happy with it, because he hoped some of his original proposal might be 
achieved along the way and acknowledged it was after all not “a monopoly of ours.”16  
Manning’s final observation was typically eccentric yet pointed: ‘‘‘Operation shopping-list’ is 
now on the move. It is my intention, if permitted, to contribute, however possibly, to its success. 
… Meanwhile I know that, in now transferring my inventiveness to a new ‘Operation salvage,’ I 
shall not, by you, be deemed unfaithful to the memory of ‘mustard seed,’ on whose tomb I shall 
put flowers every day.”17 
 The RF did end up funding fellowships per the LSE plan though there were significant 
doubts from the outset as to the program’s efficacy. Only a small part, as Manning had feared, 
went directly to IR, though the program did support subsequent pillars of U.K. IR, Jack Spence 
and Peter Lyon, among others. By 1962 it was not clear that it would be renewed and anyway 
would await Manning’s replacement, though by this time, it would not be Wight, because he had 
left IR at the LSE for European Studies at the University of Sussex.
18
  
This is perhaps a small chapter in the history of academic international relations. 
However, the discussions over and resistance to Manning’s proposal crystallized the problems 
that were endemic in IR scholarship at the time and that are still with us today, regarding 
interdisciplinary as opposed to disciplinary scholarship, and the place of an autonomous study of 
international relations among the social sciences. For instance, writing to Thompson on 
November 27, 1954, Manning emphasized the difference between two meanings of international 
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relations, the academic study and the domain being studied, or as he called them, the subject and 
the subject matter. The distinction was strategically important for Manning, because it 
underpinned his criticism of the amendment of his proposal. As Carr-Saunders had pointed out, a 
number of academic departments studied elements of the international; for Manning, this was 
beside the point if your purpose was to develop a coherent approach to studying the subject. 
While Manning was advocating for his personal vision of academic international relations, Dean 
Rusk expressed his frustration with the sort of interdisciplinary approach that the LSE ultimately 
developed. On December 2, 1954, after a trustees meeting, he wrote to Carr-Saunders, “we have 
no ready answer as to what constitutes ‘international relations’ or how such work should be 
organized within a college or university.” However, he was “skeptical about proposals for 
interdisciplinary marriages” and pointed to the challenges as well: “We would be interested in 
knowing, of course, whether you have had any more success than we have had over here in 
fusing the contributions of the international lawyer, the economist, the historian, and the 
politician into a fruitful partnership for the study of international affairs.” 
This small chapter—for many, surely less than a footnote—manifests several threads in 
.the weave of IR scholarship. First of all, it is a coda to interwar conversations about the 
disciplinary character of IR. At the same time, it is a parallel universe to the 1954 conference on 
the theory of international relations. Furthermore, it is an immediate preface to RF support for 
the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, and adds context to the story of  
Manning’s exclusion from that group.19 In the midst of the various discussions regarding the 
development of academic international relations after the Second World War stood a combative 
and difficult South African with very decided views on the status and character of international 
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relations.
20
 These views did not win the day at the time, but discussions around them shaped the 
way that international relations have been studied ever since. 
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